The Next Frontier: Preventing and Litigating Family Responsibilities Discrimination by Williams, Joan
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 
2013 
The Next Frontier: Preventing and Litigating Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination 
Joan Williams 
U.S. Department of Labor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Federal Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. 
For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
The Next Frontier: Preventing and Litigating Family Responsibilities 
Discrimination 
Abstract 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination (“FRD”), also known as caregiver discrimination, was first 
articulated as a discriminatory employment practice in the early 2000s. By 2010, FRD cases had 
increased almost 400 percent, making it perhaps the fastest growing area of employment law. FRD grew 
out of the numerous statutes in the 1960s and 1970s designed to end discrimination against individuals 
on the basis of race and gender—passage of which was largely driven by President John F. Kennedy’s 
Commission on the Status of Women (“PCSW”), established by executive order in 1961. This influential 
commission, headed by Eleanor Roosevelt until her death, was charged with reviewing progress and 
making recommendations for constructive action in a number of areas. These included differences in the 
legal treatment of men and women in regard to political and civil rights, property rights, and family 
relations, and the employment policies and practices of the government of the United States. The 
Commission also advocated for additional affirmative steps to be taken through legislative, executive, or 
administrative action to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis of sex and to enhance constructive 
employment opportunities for women. 
Keywords 
family responsibilities discrimination, FRD, employment discrimination, gender, prevention, litigation 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Williams, J. (2013). The next frontier: Preventing and litigating family responsibilities discrimination. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/1637 







This paper was prepared with funding from the U.S. Department of Labor.  The views 
expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal Government or 
the Department of Labor. 
 I. Introduction 
Family Responsibilities Discrimination (“FRD”), also known as caregiver 
discrimination, was first articulated as a discriminatory employment practice in the early 
2000s.1 By 2010, FRD cases had increased almost 400 percent, making it perhaps the 
fastest growing area of employment law.2  FRD grew out of the numerous statutes in the 
1960s and 1970s designed to end discrimination against individuals on the basis of race 
and gender—passage of which was largely driven by President John F. Kennedy’s 
Commission on the Status of Women (“PCSW”), established by executive order in 1961. 
This influential commission, headed by Eleanor Roosevelt until her death, was charged 
with reviewing progress and making recommendations for constructive action in a 
number of areas. These included differences in the legal treatment of men and women in 
regard to political and civil rights, property rights, and family relations, and the 
employment policies and practices of the government of the United States. The 
Commission also advocated for additional affirmative steps to be taken through 
legislative, executive, or administrative action to ensure nondiscrimination on the basis of 
sex and to enhance constructive employment opportunities for women.  
The PCSW culminated with a report (American Women, Report of the President’s 
Commission on the Status of Women), published in 1963.  The report recognized the 
“subtle limitations imposed by custom, upon occasion reinforced by specific barriers.” It 
found that some of the discriminatory provisions were contained in the common law, 
some were written into statute, some were upheld by court decisions, and others took the 
form of practices of industrial, labor, professional, or governmental organizations that 
discriminated against women in apprenticeship, training, hiring, wages, and promotion.3  
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While recognizing that women were negatively impacted by certain policies and 
practices, the Executive Order establishing the PCSW embodied the assumption that 
women would (and should) continue in their role as the primary caretakers of their 
families. It stated:   
WHEREAS a Governmental Commission should be charged with the 
responsibility for developing recommendations for overcoming 
discriminations in government and private employment on the basis of 
sex and for developing recommendations for services which will enable 
women to continue their role as wives and mothers while making a 
maximum contribution to the world around them.  
(Emphasis added.)4 The PCSW’s strong commitment to eliminating discrimination 
against women in the workforce was undercut by widespread assumptions about 
motherhood that continue to the present day. Social scientists have now documented that 
motherhood triggers strong negative competence and commitment assumptions that lead 
to “maternal wall” bias, wherein employees who become pregnant, become mothers, or 
begin working on a flexible work arrangement are penalized at work.5 Indeed, the leading 
study on maternal wall bias found that mothers were 37% less likely to be recommended 
for hire, only half as likely to be promoted, and offered an average of $11,000 less in 
salary than candidates with identical resumes but no children.6 In addition, even mothers 
who are indisputably committed and competent are often penalized at work because they 
are seen as less likable than their peers—and perhaps as not-so-good mothers.7  
The maternal wall for mothers is matched by the flexibility stigma for fathers. 
Fathers who request parental leave or a flexible schedule trigger sharp workplace 
penalties that stem from gender discrimination: studies show these men are penalized 
because they are seen as too feminine.8 Indeed, even men who request no 
accommodations whatsoever encounter high levels of “masculinity harassment” if they 
2
make their caregiving responsibilities salient on the job.9 This social science has paved 
the way for legal theories that challenge caregiver discrimination as gender 
discrimination.  
II. The Face of Family Responsibilities Discrimination in the Workplace
FRD in the workplace occurs when an employer takes an adverse action (such as 
termination, denial of a promotion, or refusal to hire) against an employee because of the 
employee’s caregiving responsibilities.  FRD may include pregnancy discrimination, 
discrimination against mothers and fathers, and discrimination against workers with other 
family caregiving responsibilities. While FRD most commonly affects pregnant women 
and mothers of young children, it can also affect fathers who wish to take on more than a 
nominal role in family caregiving and employees who care for aging parents, or ill or 
disabled partners.  
FRD law has developed rapidly in the past two decades. While FRD lawsuits 
were once brought primarily by mothers under the legal theory of “sex-plus” 
discrimination,10 today FRD is seen as gender discrimination, pure and simple. Plaintiffs 
have successfully alleged FRD using more than a dozen causes of action under numerous 
federal statutes.11 
By 2007, FRD had become such a significant issue that the EEOC issued 
enforcement guidance intended to define FRD, summarize the state of FRD law, and 
offer employers guidance on how to prevent discrimination against caregivers.12 The 
EEOC Guidance noted that no federal law prohibits discrimination against caregivers per 
se, but that “there are circumstances in which discrimination against caregivers might 
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constitute unlawful disparate treatment” under Title VII, specifically when such 
discrimination embodies a stereotype on the basis of sex or gender.13 The Guidance also 
points out that “In addition to sex discrimination, race or national origin discrimination 
may be a further employment barrier faced by women of color who are caregivers.” To 
describe the type of stereotyping that might give rise to a claim for FRD, the EEOC 
quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist in the following passage from its guidance: 
“[T]he faultline between work and family [is] precisely where sex-based 
overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.”  Sex-based stereotyping about 
caregiving responsibilities is not limited to childcare and includes other forms of 
caregiving, such as care of a sick parent or spouse. Thus, women with caregiving 
responsibilities may be perceived as more committed to caregiving than to their jobs 
and as less competent than other workers, regardless of how their caregiving 
responsibilities actually impact their work. Male caregivers may face the mirror 
image stereotype: that men are poorly suited to caregiving. As a result, men may be 
denied parental leave or other benefits routinely afforded their female counterparts. 
Racial and ethnic stereotypes may further limit employment opportunities for people 
of color.14 
The EEOC makes clear that “[e]mployment decisions based on [stereotypes of 
caregivers] violate federal antidiscrimination statutes . . . . Thus, for example, 
employment decisions based on stereotypes about working mothers are unlawful because 
‘the antidiscrimination laws entitle individuals to be evaluated as individuals rather than 
as members of groups having certain average characteristics.’”15 
FRD cases often involve similar fact patterns, including the following; 
• A woman’s position is “eliminated” while she is on maternity leave, yet someone
else is hired to do the work she had been doing;
• A father who takes time off to be with his children receives an impossibly heavy
workload from his supervisor and is thereafter penalized for not being able to
carry this burden;
• A mother isn’t considered for promotion because her supervisor thinks she won’t
want to work any additional hours now that she has young children;
• A man is fired when he asks for leave to care for his elderly parents.
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When an employee faces any of the above adverse actions, s/he has a claim for FRD.  
The following section describes some of the legal frameworks under which an employee 
may bring an FRD claim.16 
III. Federal Laws Most Commonly Used to Litigate FRD Claims
No federal statute expressly prohibits discrimination against caregivers.  
Causes of action for FRD arise from numerous federal and state statutes, municipal 
ordinances, and from common law. This paper focuses on federal law, but practitioners 
representing caregivers should thoroughly research any applicable state or municipal law, 
as well as common law theories of action.  
A. Title VII 
Title VII, passed one year after the Commission’s report was published, prohibits 
discrimination in employment on the basis of gender (including pregnancy), race, color, 
religion, and/or national origin.  Although, as discussed above, Title VII does not prohibit 
discrimination against caregivers per se, there are circumstances in which discrimination 
against caregivers might constitute unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender/sex or 
pregnancy.17 
Title VII claims for discrimination based on any protected classification are 
generally litigated under two theories of discrimination:  “disparate treatment,” in which 
the employer intends to discriminate against an employee within a “protected 
classification” such as gender; and disparate impact, a form of unintentional 
discrimination where an employer has a policy that is neutral on its face, but which has a 
disproportionately negative effect on a protected class (such as women or men).18 
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1. Disparate Treatment Claims
In order to bring a claim for FRD under a theory of disparate treatment, a plaintiff 
must first make out a “prima facie case.”19 A prima facie case is made up of four 
elements. First, a plaintiff must show that s/he is part of a protected class; she is qualified 
for the position; she has suffered an “adverse employment action,” such as termination or 
refusal to hire; and finally, she must provide evidence giving rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination.20 Once the plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the employer to proffer a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for its 
adverse action against the plaintiff (such as a need to reduce the workforce or a plaintiff’s 
performance problems). At this point, a plaintiff must show that the employer’s proffered 
legitimate justification is pretextual or false in order to prevail on a claim for 
discrimination. 
a. Proving membership in a protected class with evidence of sex-based
stereotyping
Proving a claim for FRD under a disparate treatment theory presents one 
particular hurdle of which litigators should be aware: because “caregiver” status is not 
itself a protected class, a plaintiff must generally link her caregiver status to gender or 
sex.21 In other words, a plaintiff must show that her employer discriminated against her 
because of a stereotype regarding caregivers that is linked in some way to gender or sex.  
Adverse employment actions motivated by a sex-based stereotype can be sex 
discrimination under Title VII.   
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The theory of sex-based stereotypes was first developed in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, in which the U.S. Supreme Court found an employer’s negative treatment of a 
female employee to be a violation of Title VII because the employer’s reason for taking 
the adverse action was that the employee was not feminine enough: she did not wear 
makeup or jewelry, or have her hair styled.22 
Stereotyping in the context of FRD is most classically the assumption that 
mothers are no longer committed to their careers once they have children.  In several 
federal cases, plaintiffs have alleged stark stereotyping evidence of discrimination on the 
basis of family responsibilities by their supervisors. In Moore v. Alabama State 
University, for example, the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor had told her that he could 
not promote her because she was pregnant, and later told her that she could not be 
considered for the promotion because she was a married mother.23 In Lust v. Sealy, Inc., a 
supervisor admitted that he didn’t consider recommending a female subordinate for a 
position that required relocation because she had children and he didn’t think she’d want 
to relocate her family.24 The plaintiff, of course, had never told him any such thing; the 
court found that “On the contrary, she had told him again and again how much she 
wanted to be promoted, even though there was no indication that a Key Account 
Manager’s position would open up any time soon in Madison.”25 
b. Proving FRD discrimination without relying on “comparator” evidence
Another hurdle faced by plaintiffs in FRD claims (and all other Title VII claims) 
is the requirement imposed by some courts that the plaintiffs proffer a comparator. In an 
FRD claim, a comparator might be another worker without children, less qualified for 
promotion than the caregiving plaintiff, who nonetheless receives the promotion.  
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Comparator evidence is, however, not necessary to prove an FRD claim.  Even 
the McDonnell-Douglas court recognized that the elements of the test were not meant to 
be rigid or inflexible.26 Nonetheless, courts sometimes apply the test in an inflexible 
manner, insisting that a plaintiff show, at the prima facie stage or at the pretext stage, that 
a similarly situated worker outside the plaintiff’s protected class (a comparator) was 
treated more favorably or differently than the plaintiff.27 
It is important to recognize (and to ensure that the trier of fact understands) that 
comparator evidence is only one way of proving a disparate treatment case. Title VII 
requires plaintiffs to prove that an adverse employment action is “because of . . . sex.” 
Nothing in the language of Title VII requires limiting probative evidence of 
discrimination to comparator evidence. Appropriately, many courts allow plaintiffs to 
survive summary judgment even if they have not identified comparators.28 A variety of 
methods permit proof of disparate treatment without comparators, including evidence that 
the adverse action was based on sex stereotyping (as discussed above) or occurred under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination such as temporal proximity29 
or remarks indicating discriminatory animus (intention).30 
2. Disparate Impact Claims
As discussed above, disparate impact is another theory of discrimination under 
Title VII, separate from disparate treatment. In a disparate treatment claim, an employer 
has a policy in place that appears neutral on its face – that is, it does not explicitly 
discriminate against a protected class. However, if that policy has a disproportionately 
negative impact on women (or any other “protected class,” e.g., a racial or religious 
group), it may be unlawful under Title VII. An example of a neutral policy that has a 
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disproportionately negative impact on women or caregivers would be a strict attendance 
policy that does not allow employees to take time off to care for ill family members.31  
Obviously, caregivers would suffer far more from such a policy than a non-caregiver.  
The employer could therefore be liable under Title VII.  Importantly, a disparate impact 
claim does not require the employee to show that the employer harbored discriminatory 
intent. 
Disparate impact claims often have proven to be an uphill battle for plaintiffs, 
however. Plaintiffs typically seek to prove disparate treatment cases with statistical 
evidence, showing that the employer’s neutral policy disproportionately affected the 
protected class at issue (for our purposes, caregivers). Courts have placed stringent 
requirements on statistical evidence; however, many of them are erroneous adoptions of 
statistical principles.32 In addition, in failure to hire cases, courts have required that the 
relevant statistical pool be comprised only of individuals interested in the job at issue and 
qualified for that job.33 
B. Family and Medical Leave Act Claims (FMLA) 
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)34 provides up to 12 weeks per year 
of job-protected, unpaid leave for employees who: 1) have a serious health condition; 2) 
need to care for a family member (spouse, child, or parent) with a serious health 
condition or have a new child in their family; and/or 3) need to tend to a qualifying 
exigency arising out of a family member’s (spouse, son, daughter, or parent) active-duty 
military status. FMLA leave may be taken all at once or intermittently.   
FMLA provides qualifying employees with three types of protection.  First, an 
employer may not interfere with, restrain or deny exercise of rights afforded by FMLA.  
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Second, an employer may not discipline or discharge an employee for taking FMLA 
leave.  And third, an employer may not discharge or discriminate against an employee for 
opposing unlawful practices under the FMLA. 
1. FRD Cases under the FMLA
Two types of FRD cases are commonly brought under the FMLA.  The first type 
is when an employer takes an action that interferes with the employee’s leave.  Such 
interference may be refusing to grant an employee leave or discouraging the employee 
from taking the leave.  The second type of claim occurs when an employer discriminates 
or retaliates against an employee for taking the leave. 
2. Limitations of FMLA Claims
The FMLA has a few significant limitations. First, the statute only applies to (1) 
public agencies and (2) private-sector employers who have fifty or more employees in 20 
or more workweeks in the current or preceding calendar year within seventy-five miles of 
the worksite in question—thus exempting employers who have hundreds of employees 
but less than fifty in any one geographic location. The impact of this is to exempt 60% of 
U.S. employers from FMLA obligations.  
Another limitation on FMLA coverage is that, when used to cover time away 
from work to care for an ill family member, the relevant illness must fit the statutory 
definition of “serious health condition.” This is defined as: “an illness, injury, 
impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves [either] inpatient-care . . . or 
continuing treatment by a health care provider.” The FMLA was never intended to cover 
a short-term, moderate illness but rather is limited to extended absences necessitated by 
serious illnesses.  
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3. The Americans with Disabilities Act May Offer Additional Leave
The ADA, discussed in detail below, prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against an individual with a disability and also requires the employer to provide a 
disabled individual with a reasonable accommodation if doing so would allow the 
employee to perform his or her job. This provision sometimes allows workers to extend 
their family leaves beyond the twelve-week period provided for under the FMLA. Under 
the ADA’s regulations, it is a reasonable accommodation to grant an employee a leave of 
absence (intermittent or otherwise) in order to deal with a disability, so long as that leave 
is not indefinite. Thus, if a pregnant woman has exhausted her FMLA leave but requires 
more time to recover from a pregnancy-related condition, she should ask her employer 
for an accommodation under the ADA (or similar state law).35 
C. The Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) 
The ADA36 protects workers from discrimination based on family responsibilities 
in two distinct ways. First, it prohibits discrimination based on a worker’s association 
with an individual with a disability. In addition, pregnant women are often entitled to 
workplace accommodations under the ADA. 
  FRD claims under the “ADA association clause” may arise when a caregiver 
takes time off from work to care for a family member with a disability. The EEOC has 
issued regulations explaining the interaction of the ADA with FRD:  
[A] qualified applicant without a disability applies for a job and discloses that his 
or her spouse has a disability.  The employer thereupon declines to hire the 
applicant because the employer believes that the applicant would have to miss 
work or frequently leave work early in order to care for the spouse. Such a refusal 
to hire would be prohibited by [the ADA].37 
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It is important to note, however, that although the ADA requires an employer to make 
reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities (such as modifications to an 
employee’s workstation), it does not require an employer to provide accommodations for 
caregivers. 
Blue-collar and low-wage women often lose their jobs when their employers deny 
them accommodations required as a result of their pregnancies, including 
accommodations as simple as the right to carry a water bottle or to have a work station 
closer to the restroom (due to severe nausea).38 Today, pregnant women often are entitled 
to accommodation under the ADA as a result of the 2008 ADA amendments, the 
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA).39 Following those 
amendments, many pregnancy-related conditions now qualify as “disabilities,” thereby 
entitling pregnant women to accommodations for medical conditions caused by 
pregnancy.  Thus, a pregnant woman suffering from gestational diabetes is entitled to a 
reasonable accommodation from her employer in order to cope with the symptoms of that 
condition. So, too, is a woman suffering from carpal tunnel syndrome, which occurs far 
more frequently in pregnant women than in any other population.40 
D. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)41 has been used by 
caregivers to challenge an employer’s decision to terminate based on the employer’s fear 
of high health insurance costs where parents have disabled children or where mothers 
have expensive, high-risk, pregnancies.42 ERISA has also been used to obtain relief when 
an employer terminates a pregnant employee in order to prevent the employee from 
taking a maternity leave.43   
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IV. How Common Are FRD Cases and How Successful Are They?
FRD cases are increasingly common. The Center for WorkLife Law (WLL) at UC 
Hastings College of the Law documented a 400% increase in FRD claims in the last 
decade as compared to the prior decade.  In comparison, there was only a 23% increase in 
all other discrimination claims during the same time period.  Moreover, plaintiffs win 
FRD cases at a higher rate than other employment-related cases. FRD cases identified by 
WLL show a greater than 50% success rate for the plaintiff, which presents serious risk 
management concerns for employers, given that FRD plaintiffs have received substantial 
awards and settlements. One plaintiff was awarded $11.65 million, another received $1.8 
million, a third was awarded $1.6 million, and a fourth obtained $940,001.44  
Employers, then, should be aware that FRD claims are a potentially serious source 
of liability. To avoid liability for FRD, employers should train personnel so that they do 
not inadvertently violate the law and create liability for their company clients.  
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
When the final report of the PCSW was published in 1963, it sought to create a 
workplace where women and men participated as equals. This goal has yet to be 
achieved, but thanks to legislation such as Title VII, the workplace has become much 
more hospitable for women.  The report assumed that women would participate in the 
workforce while continuing to shoulder most or all family responsibilities.  Increasingly, 
mothers are not the only Americans with caregiving responsibilities. Many fathers now 
shoulder childcare duties, and workers’ eldercare responsibilities are growing sharply due 
to the increase in the population of older Americans and the fact that many Americans 
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cannot retire due to economic conditions in the U.S.45 In 1963, the Report of the PCSW 
helped to elucidate the obstacles to women’s fulfillment of their potential. In the legal 
realm, the Commission devoted a section of its report to “Women under the Law.”  It 
recognized that “Equality of rights under the law for all persons, male or female, is so 
basic to democracy and its commitment to the ultimate value of the individual that it must 
be reflected in the fundamental law of the land.” At that time the Commission was 
convinced that the U.S. Constitution embodied equality of rights for men and women 
(under the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution) and that a constitutional 
amendment did not need to be sought to establish that principle. Since that time, much 
legislation addressing sex discrimination has been enacted.   
The stereotype that the home is primarily or solely the province of the woman all 
too often gives rise to workplace bias prohibited under more than a dozen statutes and 
legal theories. Although a majority of FRD claims have been successful under a wide 
variety of theories, if and when Congress considers amendments to Title VII, it should 
expressly prohibit gender discrimination based on parental status and family 
responsibilities. 
In the interim, employers should take steps to prevent family responsibilities 
discrimination. A good first step is to add language prohibiting FRD to one’s existing 
human resource materials. The Center for WorkLife Law offers a model policy 
employers can use to signal their intention to prohibit FRD.46 Employers also should 
ensure that their managerial employees know of FRD and have a resource for educating 
themselves about it. In addition, the need for maternity, disability, or FMLA leave should 
be anticipated by employers and the legal requirements for allowing such leave, e.g., 
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notice provisions, manner and means of taking leave, and length of leave, should be 
outlined in detail. Employers should also conduct periodic self-evaluations to ensure that 
external and internal leave policies are being adhered to appropriately. Internal grievance 
procedures may help in preventing litigation at an early stage so that employees who 
believe they have been discriminated against on the basis of their status as a caregiver can 
raise the issue internally, hopefully avoiding the need for litigation.  
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